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Dichotomous inference is the classification of statistical evidence as either sufficient or insufficient. It
is most commonly done through null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Although predominant,
dichotomous inferences have proven to cause countless problems. Thus, an increasing number of
methodologists have been urging researchers to recognize the continuous nature of statistical evidence
and to ban dichotomous inferences. We wanted to see whether they have had any influence on CHI.
Our analysis of CHI proceedings from the past nine years suggests that they have not.
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INTRODUCTION
By dichotomous inference we refer to the classification of statistical evidence as either sufficient or
insufficient, typically through the use of conventional cutoffs. Although dichotomous inference can be
carried out using a variety of statistical methods (e.g., Bayes factors [21], posterior probabilities [2],...),
the most popular procedure is by far null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Thus this paper
focuses on NHST. Using NHST, one first computes the probability p of “one particular test statistic
being as or more extreme than observed in our particular study, given that the model it is computed
from is correct” [2]. This model typically includes the hypothesis that there is no effect, also called the
“null hypothesis”. The p-value is then compared to a cutoff α (typically α=.05). If p is smaller than α ,
then the null hypothesis is rejected, which means there is sufficient evidence to conclude that there is
an effect. Otherwise, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected—the evidence is insufficient to conclude.
Although advocated in many textbooks and broadly applied in HCI, NHST is a loose mix of two
incompatible philosophies of statistical inference—the computation and reporting of exact p-values
follows Ronald Fisher, while the use of an α cutoff to guide decision making is taken from Neyman
and Pearson [14]. Although the Neyman-Pearson approach is thought to be well suited for automated
decision-making (e.g., for deciding which batches to reject in a factory production line), Fisher and
many others after him have rejected it as entirely inappropriate for carrying out scientific research [14].
Although Fisher initially suggested that researchers can distrust results with p > .05 as a rule of thumb,
he later insisted that p-values should be seen as a continuous measure of strength of evidence against
the null hypothesis and stated that “no scientific worker has a fixed level of significance at which
from year to year, and in all circumstances, he rejects hypotheses” [11].
While dichotomous inference through NHST has been used for decades and is still in use today,
many have recognized that the ritualistic application of a cut-off leads to a number of problems. First,
it promotes dichotomous thinking, i.e., thinking about evidence as black and white [8]. This often
results in researchers putting too much trust on results having a p-value less than the conventional
.05 threshold, irrespective of how far it is from that threshold [28]. This in turn typically results
in conclusions being overstated, or in sample means being interpreted as accurate, ignoring their
uncertainty [11]. At the same time, researchers tend to distrust p-values that are above the threshold,
even if they just missed the mark [28]. An extreme version of this, which involves the fallacy of taking
the absence of evidence as evidence of absence, consists in taking a non-significant p-value (even
p = .06) as a sign that there is no effect. A related error is considering that a significant effect and a
non-significant effect are statistically different [12, 13], or that a stream of studies with significant and
non-significant results is necessarily inconsistent or controversial [8]. Finally, dichotomous inference
with NHST encourages practices that distort the scientific literature, such as publication bias (studies
that do not achieve statistical significance are never published), outcome reporting bias (results that
do not achieve statistical significance are not reported in published studies), and significance chasing
(researchers try many different analysis methods until they obtain a significant result) [29]. All of
these issues contribute to making published studies less trustworthy and less likely to replicate.
Consequently, the practice of NHST-based dichotomous inference has been strongly discouraged
by countless statisticians and methodologists, especially in the past few years [1–3, 8, 10–12, 15, 17,
25, 29]. In 2016, the executive director of the American Statistical Association stated that “in the post
p<0.05 era, scientific argumentation is not based on whether a p-value is small enough or not. [...]
Evidence is thought of as being continuous rather than some sort of dichotomy” [24]. Recently, Gerd
Gigerenzer, a prominent psychologist and methodologist, suggested that “editors should no longer
accept manuscripts that report results as "significant" or "not significant"” [15], while others went as
far as qualifying NHST-based dichotomous inference as “scientifically destructive behavior” [2].
A commonly advocated alternative is to focus on effect sizes and their interval estimates rather than
on p-values [2, 8, 11]. However, interval estimates do not offer a sure protection against dichotomous
inference, as researchers still tend to classify results as statistically significant or not, depending on
whether an interval estimate contains zero [2, 7]. Other methodologists argue that p-values should still
be used, but only exact p-values should be reported and no mention of statistical significance should
be made [1, 2, 15–17]. This stands in contrast to many guidelines and textbooks which recommend
reporting exact p-values but without discouraging dichotomous inference [31]. Irrespective of the
statistical tools used, many modern methodologists urge researchers to think of evidence as gradual
rather than binary when interpreting their results [2, 8, 12, 25]. Peter Dixon introduced the “graded
evidence” principle, according to which “similar results should lead to similar interpretations. In other
words, if the results change a little bit, the evidence afforded by those results should only change a little
bit” [10]. He added that “describing results in terms of a catalogue of significant and nonsignificant
effects fails to satisfy this principle” and that “classifying results as either significant or nonsignificant
is an impoverished, potentially misleading way to describe evidence” [10]. Similarly, it has been
suggested that in HCI “a statistical analysis should [...] be designed so that similar experimental
outcomes yield similar results and conclusions” [11]. Nevertheless, some methodologists believe that
α cutoffs still have a place, and suggest for example that the issues of overconfident claims and
irreplicable findings can be alleviated by switching to a more stringent cutoff of α = .005 [5].
Although there is still an ongoing debate on whether dichotomous inferences should be banned from
the researcher’s toolbox, the past few years have seen a prolific literature and solid arguments against
their use. Since HCI (like many other disciplines) has traditionally been dominated by NHST-based
dichotomous inference, we wanted to examine whether the recent literature against dichotomous
inferences has had any influence on CHI authors in the past few years. To this end, we analyzed all
articles from the CHI proceedings between 2010 and 2018, using p-value inequalities (e.g., p<.01) and
statistical significance language as indicators of dichotomous inferences.
CHI PROCEEDINGS ANALYSIS
We collected the CHI conference proceedings from 2010 to 2018 (4234 articles in total), and converted
all the PDF files to text files using pdfminer1. We then analyzed the text files and extracted sentences1github.com/euske/pdfminer
using NLTK 2. All scripts, results and plots are available as supplementary material3.2github.com/nltk/nltk
3www.aviz.fr/dichotomous
We were interested both in how inferential statistics are reported, and in the use of significance
language. For the former, we examined how often p-values were reported in the form of inequalities
(e.g., p < .05, p < .01, p > .05), and how often they were reported as exact values (e.g., p = .0412). Although
p-value inequalities are indicative of the use of NHST cutoffs, most guidelines that recommend
reporting exact p-values also recommend reporting an inequality when the p-value is very small (e.g.,
p < .001 [31] or p < .0001). Therefore, we classified those cases as ambiguous. In addition, we looked at
the reporting of confidence intervals, which are by far the most common interval estimates [8].
We therefore used the following search strings:
• To find p-value inequalities we looked for "p <", "p >", "p<", and "p>".
• To find exact p-values we looked for "p =" and "p=".
• To identify ambiguous cases we looked for occurrences of "p <X" and "p<X", with X < 0.01.
These occurrences were eliminated from the list of p-value inequalities.
• To identify the reporting of confidence intervals we looked for "confidence interval", "% ci",
and "%ci". All string searches were case-insensitive.
The use of significance language is more difficult to detect. Although the phrase “statistically
significant” is univocal, many authors use the term “significant” without the qualifier “statistically”,
rendering the word ambiguous. For example, “a significant decrease” can be used to express effect
magnitude, while occurrences of “a significant contribution” or “significant others” are unlikely to be
related to statistical inference. Nevertheless, phrases such as “no significant effect” or “a significant
interaction” are reasonably likely to refer to statistical significance. In order to gather a list of use
cases of "significant" and "significantly" that are likely to refer to statistical significance, we
listed all trigrams (sequence of three words) that contained either of these two words in the middle.
We obtained a list of 10,334 trigrams, which we pruned by removing all trigrams occurring less than
three times (the most common trigram was “a significant effect”, with 1151 occurrences). This left
us with 1250 trigrams to consider. Two coders (authors of this article) separately coded whether
they considered that each of the 1250 trigrams was likely to refer to statistical significance. The two
coders reached an agreement of Cohen’s κ = 0.74. We considered that a trigram was likely to refer to
statistical significance when both coders agreed it was. This was the case for 676 trigrams out of the
1250. Each of these 676 trigrams was then used as a search term.
In addition to looking for likely uses of significant language using the 676 trigrams, we searched
the term "statistically significant" to identify sure occurrences of significance language.
REPORTING HABITS AND DICHOTOMOUS INFERENCES ACROSS YEARS
The results of our analysis across conference years (2010–2018) are reported in Fig. 1 to Fig. 3.
Fig. 1 shows the proportion of CHI papers that only report p-value inequalities (dark blue, bottom)
and the proportion of papers that only report exact p-values (light blue, top). Both categories can
contain ambiguous p-value formats (e.g., p<.0001), but all other p-values have to be in the same
format. The category “other” (hatched bars, middle) represents papers with p-values that either mix
the two formats, or whose status is undetermined because they only contain ambiguous p-value
formats. While the proportion of papers reporting p-values seems stable (around 50% of all CHI
papers, irrespective of whether they include a user study), the proportion of papers that exclusively
report p-value inequalities seems to have decreased from 2010 to 2018. Meanwhile, the proportion of
papers that exclusively report exact p-values seems to have slightly increased. This suggests that the
recommendation to report exact p-values [31] is being increasingly endorsed at CHI, although the
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Figure 3: Use of significance language in
CHI proceedings from 2010 to 2018.
Fig. 2 shows the proportion of CHI papers reporting confidence intervals, which has also seen an
increase from 2010 to 2018 (from 6% to 15%). Thus, while p-values remain largely dominant, there is
an increasing attention paid to effect sizes and the uncertainty around their estimates [2, 8, 11].
Fig. 3 paints a less optimistic picture about the prevalence of dichotomous inferences. The bottom
bars (dark red) show the proportion of papers using the term “statistically significant”, while the top
bars (red) show the proportion of papers that are likely to employ other forms of significance language.
Overall, the use of significance language is highly common (about 50% of papers) and has remained
stable from 2010 to 2018. Nevertheless, the relative proportion of papers using “statistically significant”
has been slightly increasing. Methodologists have often deplored that the term “significant” is easily
confused with “important”, and thus it has been recommended not to omit the term “statistically”. It
seems that CHI authors have been increasingly following this advice.
Overall, our results suggest that more and more CHI authors are embracing best reporting practices
(i.e., reporting exact p-values, reporting interval estimates, and avoiding the term “significant” without
the qualifier “statistically”). However, the trends are rather modest, and despite these slow changes
in reporting habits, the prevalence of dichotomous inferences as captured by the use of significance
language shows no sign of diminishing. It is then fair to assume that the numerous criticisms of
dichotomous inference by prominent methodologists have had virtually no influence on CHI.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN REPORTING HABITS AND DICHOTOMOUS INFERENCES
We wanted to examine whether reporting habits (i.e., p-value inequalities, exact p-values, and confi-





















Figure 4: Euler diagram showing the relationship between p-value reporting style and use of signif-
icance language in the CHI proceedings from 2010 to 2018. The paper count is provided for each of
the 8 mutually exclusive regions in the diagram. Made with EulerAPE [26].
The area-proportional Euler diagram in Fig. 4 shows the relationships between the use of significant
language and p-value reporting format. The red ellipse shows the total number of CHI papers that
likely employ significance language4, all years confounded (2010–2018). The bottom hatched ellipse4Contrary to the top red bars in Fig. 3, papers
containing the phrase “statistically significant”
are not excluded here. In fact, many of the tri-
grams we retained during the coding process
contained that phrase. However, since trigrams
occurring less than 3 times were not coded, a
few papers using the term “statistically signifi-
cant” (about 6%) were not captured.
shows the total number of CHI papers that report p-value inequalities, while the top hatched ellipse
shows the number of CHI papers that report exact p-values. Papers at the intersection report both.
Papers that only report p-values whose format is ambiguous (e.g., p < .0001) are not shown.
This diagram confirms what Fig. 1 has already showed, that is, there are about as many papers
reporting p inequalities as exact p-values, while the majority of papers report a mix of both. Crucially,
most papers we found to be likely to use significance language report p-values, and conversely, the
vast majority of papers reporting p-values likely use significance language. Specifically, the likely
presence of significant language was found in 88% of papers which only report p-value inequalities, in
80% of papers which only report exact p-values, and in 95% of papers which report both. It would
thus seems that the reporting of exact p-values does not help to reduce dichotomous inferences.
Fig. 5 shows a similar Euler diagram that includes data on confidence intervals. The blue hatched
ellipse shows all CHI papers that report p-values in any form, while the green ellipse (top) shows all
CHI papers that report confidence intervals. Again, significance language seems to be used across the
board. However, out of the 22+40=62 papers that exclusively report confidence intervals, only 22 (35%)
likely use significant language. Although few papers exlusively report confidence intervals, this trend



















Figure 5: Euler diagram showing the relationship between the reporting of p-values vs. confidence in-
tervals and the use of significance language in theCHI proceedings from2010 to 2018. The paper count
is provided for each of the 8 mutually exclusive regions in the diagram. Made with EulerAPE [26].
language) and papers that report both (94%). It therefore seems that CHI authors who only report
confidence intervals are less likely to use dichotomous inferences in their communication, perhaps
because they follow reporting principles from estimation statistics (sometimes dubbed “the new
statistics”) [8, 20], which require to focus on interval estimates and avoid dichotomous interpretations.
To get a sense of why some articles appear to use significance language without reporting statistics,
we randomly sampled 10 articles from the uniform pink region in the Euler diagram of Fig. 4 (499
articles). Of the 10 articles, 4 were significance language false positives (“significant” was used
colloquially), and 1 was a p-value false negative (it stated a “p-value of 0.0000984 << 0.05”). Of the
remaining 5 that were correctly classified, 2 used ambiguous p formatting in that they only reported
small p-values (e.g., “p < 0.0005”, “p < 0.001”), 2 reported statistical significance without p-values (one
reported “statistically significant (α = 0.05)”, and the other one reported no numerical information),
and 1 employed statistical significance language when discussing related work.
We again randomly sampled 10 articles from the uniform pink region in the second Euler diagram
from Fig. 5, which only contains articles for which we found no p-value whatsoever (irrespective of
the format) and no confidence interval (360 articles). Of the 10 articles sampled, 4 were significance
language false positives, while there was no p-value or CI false negative. Of the remaining 6 that
were correctly classified, 1 reported statistical significance without any numerical information, and 5
employed statistical significance language when discussing related work.
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, FUTUREWORK
This work is only a quick investigation of the prevalence of dichotomous inferences at CHI, and it has
of course a number of limitations. First of all, our classification of CHI papers into articles that use
or do not use significance language is imperfect. Some of the trigrams we rated as likely to refer to
statistical significance might lead to correct classifications in some papers, but to false positives in
others. For example, we rated “is significant for” as likely to refer to statistical significance, but it led
to one of the 4 false positives we identified in the diagram of Fig. 4. At the same time, we erred on
the side of caution while classifying trigrams, and we ignored many infrequent trigrams (88% of all
10,334 trigrams, which account for 35% of all occurrences), so our dataset is also likely to contain false
negatives. At this point we cannot easily assess the number of false positives and false negatives, and
which are the most common. Nevertheless, the remarkable overlap between likely use of statistical
language and reporting of p-values shown in Fig. 5 suggests that our classification is reasonably
accurate overall. Thus there are reasons to think that the trends we have seen are not overly affected
by the presence of false negatives and false positives.
Similarly, a few false positives and false negatives might have occurred in our analysis of statistical
reporting formats. In particular, because we analyze only the text of the PDFs, we could not capture
statistics that were reported in figures. However, it is reasonable to assume that most papers reporting
p-values or confidence intervals in figures also mention them in the text. As for tables, the conversion
to text seemed to have preserved table content in most cases, but we cannot ascertain that all tables
were correctly converted. Other p-values or confidence intervals might have been missed because
they were reported in a non-standard fashion (see, e.g., our previous example of an article reporting
“p-value of 0.0000984 << 0.05”). Conversely, paper authors may discuss confidence intervals orp-values
without reporting them, for example in methodological articles. However, due to the prevalence of
studies at CHI and the very standardized way of presenting their results, we believe that false positives
and false negatives in our analysis of statistical reporting were not too common.
We did not try to distinguish between papers with a user study and papers without: our analyses
include all CHI papers without distinction. Depending on the year and on the source, it has been
estimated that between 78% and 91% of CHI papers report a user study [4, 6, 19]. Some of these papers
focus on reporting qualitative observations and/or descriptive statistics (and are thus beyond the
scope of this article), while others report inferential statistics. Our experience is that the overwhelming
majority of the latter use frequentist inference (and thus report p-values and/or confidence intervals),
while papers employing other methods (e.g., Bayesian inference [18]) represent a tiny minority.
Therefore, there are good reasons to believe that the union of the hatched blue and green regions in
Fig. 5 (about 50% of all papers) is indicative of the proportion of CHI papers between 2010 and 2018
reporting user studies with inferential statistics.
Overall, we found that the vast majority of CHI papers reporting inferential statistics make di-
chotomous inferences. Despite modest improvements in reporting habits (e.g., exact p-values are
more frequently reported), the prevalence of NHST-based dichotomous inferences appears to have
shown no sign of evolution since 2010. Thus the numerous calls for avoiding dichotomous infer-
ences [1–3, 8, 10–12, 15, 17, 25, 29] seem to have had virtually no effect on the CHI community.
Reassuringly, a small but increasing minority of papers focus their inferences on confidence intervals,
and among these, dichotomous inferences seem less prevalent. However, among papers reporting
both confidence intervals and p-values, dichotomous inferences are remarkably common. We also
found that significance language is sometimes used to summarize previously published studies, a
practice that can possibly oversimplify or mischaracterize the literature [22].
We have only looked at the presence of significance language by searching the terms “significant"
and “significantly", but dichotomous conclusions can be made in many other ways, with statements
like “we found that task has an effect on performance, but not technique”. By presenting statistically
significant results as sure findings or by implicitly accepting the null hypothesis, such statements are
also diagnostic of dichotomous inference. Conversely, hedges and terms such as “likely”, ”possibly”,
and “evidence” could be indicative of nuanced conclusions, which are recommended to faithfully
communicate scientific findings [23, 30, 32] and to give readers the freedom to evaluate evidence and
reach conclusions by themselves [27]. Though interesting to study as future work, the extent to which
conclusions are binary or nuanced is likely hard to analyze using automated text processing tools.
While there is an overabundance of guidelines on NHST, guidance on how to interpret results in a
non-dichotomous manner is harder to find. For advice on how to interpret p-values without using
dichotomous language, see the recent blog post by Frank Harrel [16]5. For advice on how to interpret5For examples of studies, see the references in
Hurlbert and Lombardi [17] on top of p.314. confidence intervals without using dichotomous language, see Cumming [9] and Dragicevic [11]6.
6For examples of studies in HCI and Vis, see
aviz.fr/badstats#papers and aviz.fr/ci/.
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COMMENTARIES
This section contains the non-anonymous reviews posted during the alt.chi open reviewing process, and for which
we obtained the reviewer’s consent to add to this author’s version.
Xiaojun Bi
This paper is thought-provoking. The authors investigated a common practice in the CHI community: the usage of
dichotomous Inferences. The majority of the researchers in CHI take it for granted and heavily rely on dichotomous
Inferences to draw conclusions. The authors point out the potential problems of this practice, and refer to the
solutions that are practiced in other fields such as psychology and medical research.
I hope this paper would draw the CHI community’s attention to the potential problems of using dichotomous
Inferences, and promote discussion on how to solve this issue. They mentioned some approaches such as reporting
effect size and confidence interval.s I hope these methods will serve as a start point and more methods will be
suggested.
To further promote the discussion, it would be great if CHI could organize a panel to discuss this issue, and
suggest possible actions CHI researchers can take to alleviate this issue. Maybe one of the authors could serve as
the coordinator to invite panelists and moderate the discussion? I look forward to seeing such an event at CHI.
Relationship to Authors: (none specified)
Géry Casiez
First I find this is a very interesting and relevant work for the community addressing important questions that
should be more discussed. Overall there should exist more work investigating how the community use and report
statistical analyses. The approach followed by the authors to analyze so many papers is impressive. Below I provide
some feedback to improve the quality of the paper.
The authors should clarify what they mean by exact p-values. What is an exact p-value? How many decimals
are required to be exact? Is it allowed to do some rounding? How? I raise this question because p < 0.001 is qualified
by the authors as ambiguous. What would it bring to report for example p = 0.0008967? I guess statistical software
already report rounded p-values at some point.
As the authors state, HCI researchers do not seem to read papers from the statistical community but they can
read stats for HCI. One example is the recent book “Modern Statistical Methods for HCI” 10.1007/978-3-319-26633-
6. I recommend reading chapter 5 written by Koji Yatani. He says: “Another common misunderstanding is that the
p value indicates the magnitude of an effect. For example, someone might say that the effect with p = 0.001 is larger
than with p = 0.01. This is not true. The p value has nothing to do with the magnitude of an effect. The p value is
merely the conditional probability of the occurrence of the data you observed given the null hypothesis. It does not
give us any information of how large the effect is, and we need another metric.” As a result I don’t understand why
exact p-values should be reported. At least everyone is not on the same line and the authors only expose one point
of view, shared by a given number of statisticians. It is not that clear to me that we should report “exact” p-values
because the direct consequence is that p-values indicate the magnitude of an effect. After reading chap 5, what can
you reply to Koji Yatani?
Koji Yatani also says “Effect sizes and power analysis can mitigate over-reliance on the p value”. With that regard
the authors talk about confidence intervals but they do not saymuch about eta-square values, for example, and how
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they are reported in papers. Regarding confidence intervals, I do not agree with the following sentence “few papers
report p-values or confidence intervals in figures without ever mentioning them in the text”. Instead I consider there
are many papers that report confidence intervals ONLY in figures.
In summary, very interesting analysis of work published at CHI but I remain to be convinced about the reporting
of exact p-values.
Relationship to Authors: (none specified)
Andy Cockburn
The following is my unaltered review for the original submission.
Great work.
One of the things that struck me while reading the paper is the issue who/what contributes to the continuance
of reporting dichotomous outcomes? Often, but not always, the choice to report dichotomous outcomes reflects the
authors’ true desire. Sometimes, however, the author would prefer to NOT report dichotomous outcomes (for good
reasons), but is compelled to do so by their fear/knowledge that if not included, reviewers will expect it and criticise
its absence (I’ve certainly succumbed to this in past papers). Other times, the authors stick by their convictions
and choose not to brand outcomes as “sig./not sig.”, but get beaten up by reviewers for following through with their
choice... then, in rebuttal authors can stick with their convictions to not report (which is likely acceptance suicide)
or bow to the reviewers’ “wisdom” and include it (elevating acceptance probability) – I’ve fallen victim to this on
both sides.
Moving away from dichotomous testing seems to require a step-change from the whole community. It’s not
practical for individuals to change their practice while the community maintains its expectations... the individuals
who move away will simply have their papers rejected. It pretty much requires everyone to agree simultaneously
that we’ve had enough of the approach, and eliminate it in one fell swoop. But this seems unrealistic. Furthermore,
there is more than one legitimate change in practice that would improve the situation:
• we might adjust what we mean (as authors and reviewers) with the word “significant” – I could imagine
a scale of normative terminology indicating different levels of likelihood of observing the data (or more
extreme) if the null were true: “suggestive”, “significant”, “...”;
• we might alter the boundaries at which we assign these terms;
• we might develop more nuanced appreciation of what threshold terms mean (I think probably the key prob-
lem with p values is that a shocking proportion don’t know the meaning);
• we might make the addition of further data a key part in results interpretation (CIs, effect sizes, etc., as is
becoming more common in our field).
• ...
And problematically, while we have more than one possible path for modifying our behaviour as authors and
reviewers, the likelihood that any one path will be chosen is commensurately reduced (like the step change required
for banning dichotomous reporting).
Relationship to Authors: I have had several conversations with Pierre and I hope to work with his team in the
future, but have not done so to date.
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Geoff Cumming
It’s worth reflecting on how bizarre the dominant logic for drawing conclusions from data is. A result is pronounced
’real’ or not, ’nonzero’ or not, ’existing’ or not. The true size of the effect in question does influence what result is
found, but sample size is also highly influential, and this should not be a factor in judging existence. I’m referring,
of course, to dichotomous thinking, which usually focuses on statistical significance. Finding p < .05 brings joy,
publication, funding, and fame, whereas p > .05 brings the opposite. NHST has dominated in many disciplines for
more than half a century; the method has been justifiably excoriated by leading scholars for just as long. And yet,
unaccountably, it persists! Advocacy of much better alternatives, notably estimation (effect sizes and confidence
intervals) has become more widespread in recent years, along with the rise of Open Science practices designed to
make published research more trustworthy. Moving beyond dichotomous thinking to these better practices would
improve research greatly.
The first two pages of this paper review the issue well and explain how dichotomous thinking leads to big prob-
lems, especially selective publication, and also cherry-picking and other strategies to find small p values, somehow.
We could add that a mistaken faith in statistical significance suggests replication isn’t needed. Surprise: very few
replications are conducted!
Computer scanning of text has drawbacks, which the authors acknowledge and discuss, but their main findings
are strong and justified. It seems, sadly, that in HCI, at least as represented by CHI proceedings, the level of domi-
nance of dichotomous thinking in statistical inference has remained pretty much constant over the last decade or
so. There is encouragement in the increasing use of confidence intervals, but from a small base, and still only about
1% of papers report CIs without signs of dichotomous interpretation.
I hope this paper will serve as a wake-up call among HCI researchers and practitioners. Issues for discussion and
action should include:
(1) Recognition of the damage that dichotomous thinking has done and is doing.
(2) Discussion of which changes (estimation? Open Science practices? Bayesian techniques?) hold most promise
for HCI.
(3) Discussion of which are the most effective strategies for achieving widespread change.
P.S. For illustrations of just one terrible feature of p values, at YouTube search for ‘dance of the p values’ and
‘significance roulette’
Relationship to Authors: I have known one author (Pierre) for many years. We have met a couple of times. We
have discussed many things, but we have never published or conducted research together.
Jouni Helske
The paper’s goal seem to be two-fold: First, it raises the issue of dichotomous thinking on the table for the CHI com-
munity, which is no doubt important goal. The second part of the paper complements the more general discussion
with data analysis of past CHI papers, and concludes that the transition to nuanced interpretation of statistical
analysis has not been as fast as one could have hoped for (although I am not really surprised by the results).
Overall the paper is well written. The automatic text analysis has likely added some noise the results (for example
the sensitivity checks done for some random samples suggest that there were several issues with the data processing
and classification), but the authors acknowledge these issues well, and as they are not claiming dichotomously(!)
their results, I don’t think these potential issues are crucial in delivering the main messages of the paper.
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Some minor issues: There seems to be typo in the description of text mining, one the strings is just “p ”, not “p
>”, but the actual script looks to be using the correct string.
For ambiguous case, were space on both sides of > tested? Definition of the actual threshold seems bit confusing,
the text suggests 0.001 but later it is 0.01? And the scripts seem to suggest that 0.01 was used.
Authors write “use frequentist inference (and thus report p-values and/or confidence intervals), while papers
employing other methods (e.g., Bayesian inference [15] or likelihood inference)”. This is unclear. What is meant
by likelihood inference? We can have (and often have) frequentist inference based on maximizing the likelihood
function, but on the other hand likelihood has a crucial place in Bayesian inference as well. I assume authors
are trying to make distinction between test-statistic based inference (e.g. t-tests) and model based inference (e.g.
regression models etc)? Latter often report p-values and confidence intervals as well though.
Relationship to Authors: I work at the same department in Linköping University as the first author, and we have
common research interests, but I have not been involved in makings of this paper.
Jessica Hullman
This paper presents the results of an analysis of over 4k CHI papers from 2010 - 2018 used to investigate whethe
recommendations among statistical reformers to avoid dichotomous presentation of effects has had an influence in
the CHI community. The paper concludes that it has not: ’We wanted to see whether they have had any influence
on CHI. Our analysis of CHI proceedings from the past eight years suggests that they have not.’
The classification approach for designating different styles of p value usage as well as significance language were
reasonable and clearly described. The random sample of 10 papers from several subsets of the papers indicate that
the error rate is non-trivial on some classifications. A useful followup would be to examine each of the 4k papers.
The findings do not indicate evidence of a decrease of dichotomization overall, but do suggest that certain sug-
gested practices within NHST, like exact p value reporting and use of the adjective statistically with significant have
increased. Overall these are valuable findings to point out to the CHI committee, and provide a basis for speculation
on why researches may be "selectively listening" to advice on statistical reform. I suspect the difficulty for many
researchers to learn alternatives to NHST may be one cause.
It occurs to me that the abstract of the paper could allude more to at least one other finding in addition to the
lack of perceived evidence that dichotomization is decreasing. It’s interesting to think about the statement at the
end of the abstract as an example of the nuances of dichotomization – one can still state that there does not appear
to be an effect without using p values. It reminds me of how statistical reformers like Gelman have discussed the
irrationalit of describing comparions in data anaysis, regardless of what inference paradigm, as indicating that there
is "no difference" since in reality there is always some difference, if slight. A discussion of whether dichotomization
can occur in more subtle ways outside of NHST would be an interesting follow up to this work.
This paper is an important data point in the transparent statistics movement and stands to call attention to ways
that CHI researcher could be more mindful of hte way they report their results. I wholly endorse its acceptance to
alt.chi.
Relationship to Authors: (none specified)
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Matthew Kay
I won’t add much more to the substantive comments in support of this paper. It is excellent and important meta
work and will generate interesting discussion at the conference!
I did want to comment on this point:
“Thus the calls for avoiding dichotomous inferences [2, 3, 8–10, 14, 22, 27] seem to have had virtually no effect on the
CHI community. Perhaps this is because the crisis of confidence that affected psychology and medicine and led these
disciplines to reconsider their methodology has not (yet) happened in HCI.”
Interestingly, I have found—having attended some psychology reform conferences and talked with several people
leading this charge—that even among themethods reformers in psychology, a lot of the prominent folks still seem to
think dichotomously and advocate for dichotomous methods. They just want *better* dichotomous methods (strict
hypothesis pre-registration with large sample sizes, that sort of thing). It may be worth reflecting on whether or
not HCI can avoid that particular trap (sadly this paper makes me skeptical), as I think our work is even less suited
to dichotomous thinking than psychology is (give me any two interfaces for a task and I don’t need a p value to
tell you there’s *some* difference between them).
Relationship to Authors: I have organized workshops and published with Pierre in the past.
Arnaud Prouzeau
This paper presents a review about the use of dichotomous inference in the papers coming from the CHI conference.
The authors did a text analysis in the last 8 proceedings of the conference looking for evidence of the use of p-
values inequalities, exact p-values and significance language. They found that the use of p-values inequalities is
decreasing, the use of exact p-values and confidence interval is increasing over the years. On the other hand, the
use of significance language is stable and correlated with the use of exact p-value and confidence interval, meaning
that their use didn’t prevent the authors to do dichotomous inferences.
Overall, the paper is very well written, the analysis is well done and clearly presented. This is a very important
topic in our community and this paper is a step in the direction of its more global understanding.
A global understanding of this issue by the entire community is probably key before seeing an important change
in the papers. To start doing it now could avoid in HCI the replication crisis which happened in psychology.
One issue with this paper, which is minor, but if fixed could foster a bigger debate, is the future work, which is
too weak in my opinion considering the issue. I was expecting some directions on how to report results without
dichotomous inferences? The authors provided a lot of references, but we can’t really expect all CHI authors to read
them all (They should, but they won’t). It would be good to point to one or two guidelines references or a summary
of the different options, with concrete examples of reporting. It would also be interesting to know what is done in
other fields like psychology and medicine which lived a confidence crisis that led to a change of methodology.
Overall, I strongly support this paper for its quality and the importance of the topic tackled in it. I would like to
see a more practical approach of what we should do now, what would be the best practices for result reporting.
Relationship to Authors: (none specified)
Theophanis Tsandilas
The issue discussed by the paper is very relevant to the CHI community and touches a very important problem. I
am aware that the authors, in particular the second author, have been working on these problems for several years.
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Pierre Dragicevic’s page on "bad stats" (https://aviz.fr/badstats) has been very influential and has influenced my
own way of thinking and my research methods. The alt.chi paper strengthens discussions about problems on how
the HCI community reports on statistical results and draws conclusions.
The authors base their analysis on a large volume of past CHI publications. This is a nice contribution by itself.
Although the analysis method has limitations (as it is largely based on the accuracy of an automatic language-
processing system), I believe that its results are representative of real trends. I also find that this topic is very
appropriate for alt.chi. It can generate a lot of discussions that may further encourage the community to rethink
both about how we write and how we review papers. For all these reasons, I am very supportive of this work.
I would like to admit that I have been the author of several of those dichotomous-thinking CHI papers. And
although I am well aware of the problems discussed by the paper, I find that making the transition to a pure
"non-dichotomous" reporting style is not easy (although I try). In this sense, I would like to present my additional
thoughts but also criticisms of this work, with the hope that they could further contribute to the discussion:
My personal interaction with HCI researchers is that very few people are even aware of the problems of NHST. I
feel that related discussions in the HCI community have started only recently (4-6 years) within a very limited circle
of people. I would be surprised if practices had changed within so little time. That said, I would be very interested
in a future study that explores our community’ attitudes in more depth. Are HCI researchers really aware of these
problems and to what extent? If yes, what are the difficulties of changing research strategies? The textbooks from
which people learn about experimental design in HCI, the lack of examples, the reviewing process, the fact that
thesis supervisors do not have the time to make the effort to adopt new approaches, confusion about what is correct
and what is not, practical problems about how to tackle specific modeling/inference problems?
The authors have been careful in their writing and clearly state "that there is still an ongoing debate on whether
dichotomous inferences should be banned." However, I would also expect a short discussion about why there is an
ongoing debate (probably less about the use of dichotomous inference and more about the use of p-values). Why
is the problem so complex and why do even statisticians not fully agree? The paper cites a statement of ASA’s
executive director, but I would also like to refer to the ASA’s official statement about p-values, which shows a hard
compromise of very different points of view, as the note below the paper and the supplementary material indicate
(See: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00031305.2016.1154108)
Concerning the use of the wording "statistically significant." Unfortunately, such wording is very often used as
a final "decision-making" statement. However, people often tend to simply use it as a "statistical jargon" to avoid
subjectivity, as there is no experience with more nuanced vocabularies, while it is always easy to abuse language. I
feel that some authors who use this terminology make an effort to interpret results and make conclusions based on
the full set of evidence, including visualizations of the effect, variance, etc. Thus, I am a bit more optimistic, in the
sense that the use of dichotomous language at the level of statistics does not always translate into dichotomous
language at the level of overall conclusions. But as the paper mentions, this requires further research.
I personally feel that subjectively adapting the language to accommodate difference levels of statistical evidence
is not an easy exercise. I am not sure what the best approach to this direction is, and I definitely look for advice and
examples on this problem. Cohen’s wording for effect sizes was also an attempt to apply nuances with words, but
as words became a standard, the approach was widely criticized. I am also familiar with the textbook of Baguley
[3], correctly cited by the paper as someone who has criticized dichotomous thinking. However, the term "statisti-
cally significant" is very often used (although not consistently) by the author for many of his examples throughout
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the textbook – the textbook would have been clearly classified into the category of "combining CIs + p values +
dichotomous thinking" by the paper’s analysis. The exercise can be especially difficult when reporting on ANOVA
models (largely used in HCI), e.g., when summarizing overall effects or interactions. (Some would argue for aban-
doning such methods altogether, but it seems to me that there is no consensus on such a direction.) I think that the
best approach might be to report statistics (e.g., in a table) without even trying to individually characterize their
magnitude with subjective statements or standardized words.
I have some additional minor questions about the analysis:
The discussion section mentions that "probably few papers report p-values or confidence intervals in figures
without mentioning them in the text." I would be more careful about this statement. I have seen (and used in
the past) figures showing "statistical significance" on top of graphs with lines and stars. Also many figures show
confidence intervals without even mentioning what they are.
I think that CIs are very commonly used to estimate individual means (often incorrectly constructed over the full
set of repeated trials or observations) and less often for estimating differences. However, dichotomous statements
are usually relevant to the second only case. To what extent is the observation that CIs lead less to dichotomous
thinking than p-values due to this fact? I am curious about whether the approach could differentiate between such
types of uses.
ASA seems to suggest complete report of p-values, although it is still unclear what level of precision is enough.
I think that this issue requires more careful examination, but this is certainly out of the scope of the present sub-
mission. However, most HCI researchers seem to follow APA’s recommendations for reporting statistics (they were
suggested to me by several reviewers in the past), which advise authors to report p values lower than .001 as p <
.001. Thus, I find that the author’s decision to ignore these cases from the analysis (as ambiguous) is a bit strict,
given that the papers followed what was considered as a "good style of writing."
Relationship to Authors: I am in conflict with the second author, as we work at the same research institution,
although we are not in the same team. We have collaborated together and have very frequent discussions about
statistics.
Chat Wacharamanotham
The prevalence of dichotomous inference is known anecdotally among those who are concerned about statistical
practices in the CHI community. This paper *quantifies* this phenomenon and show how it developed over time.
Having this information will allow us—as a community—to determine whether we are willing to live with this with
dichotomous inference or to move forward to adopt statistical methods that allow more nuanced understanding of
the data.
The methodology is sound. I praise the authors of acknowledging the limitations of their methodology and
sampled some data to estimate the impact of the limitations.
What can this paper improve:
To me, a take-home message of this paper is that "We tell people to report confidence intervals, and they in-
creasingly report them. But their interpretation is are still focusing on p-values." The results in this paper indicate
that the community needs to double down in educating authors and reviewers how to interpret beyond statistical
significance. To this end, I think that our community still lacks educational resources for teaching how to interpret
(and, for reviewers, to evaluate the interpretations) beyond dichotomous. I wished the authors could have pointed
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readers who are interested in learning to some resources, both from the field of statistics (e.g., Cumming’s book)
and exemplars in our field (e.g., one of the authors’ collection of paper at "badstats" website).
Possible directions for future work
Let me mebe a devil’s advocate: Despite the evidence presented in this paper, it is unclear how harmful the
dichotomous interpretation is to CHI research. It could be that most of the p-values are so low and their effect sizes
are so high that even if we change the interpretation to continuous, it wouldn’t matter. I think it would be awesome
if in the future we can say that X% of the papers would have a different conclusion if we change from dichotomous
interpretation to continuous interpretation.
A missed opportunity is the absent of a reference point to compare CHI to other fields. Is CHI doing better or
worse compared to amore rigor field (such as psychology) or neighbor fields (such as VIS)? I think that a comparison
across fields is an interesting future direction.
Thoughts on dichotomous inference and incentive structure of the review process:
Dichotomous inference is easier for both the reviewers and the authors. This criterion is clear-cut and established.
Assuming that there is a credible effect in the results, an author would feel safe to use dichotomous inference. At
least, he can be sure that he won’t get a disagreement from the reviewers. Since the authors don’t know whether
their reviewers are knowledgable in non-dichotomous inference (and since it is expectable that the majority of the
reviewers aren’t knowledgable in this), it would be game-theoretically sensible for the authors to actually use the
dichotomous inference.
The reviewing game is a single-shot game (in the sense of game theory). The next time that an author submits
a paper, he will have another set of reviewers. Even if he learned to use continuous inference from one submission,
the incentive structure is against him to use a continuous inference in the next submission.
One way to break this game is to provide a channel to communicate information. I could imagine that reviewers
can tick a set of checkboxes in PCS to specify their statistical expertise. Each submission metadata can also contain
an optional field that specifies the statistical methods used. In the reviewing process, in addition to the usual set
of reviewers, one may add a statistical reviewer to weigh in on the inferential method used in the paper (without
commenting on other parts). This mechanism could help alleviate anxiety from the side of authors. It could break
the current incentive structure that promotes dichotomous interpretation as a "safe way".
Relationship to Authors: I previously co-authored with Pierre, and he was also in my PhD committee.
Shumin Zhai
The authors bring up (again) a really important topic in HCI research. We have to accept this paper and its key
messages (I would have recommended accepting them as a paper but alt.chi is fine too). We as a community should
use this as another opportunity to improve our research analysis practice.
Dichotomous statistics, NHST, or inferential statistics in general are convenient, relatively easy, simplified and
often misleading standardization of evidence-based logic and acceptance criteria. They had been criticized from
the beginning of these methods’ existence to no avail. Alternative methods have always ran into similar challenges.
Personally I think we should move to descriptive statistics and visualization that can give the reader an accurate
reading of the data distribution in the context of the research question or system design, and in comparison to other
relevant variables, designs, and individual differences. The challenge is that reviewers and readers will have to be
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sophisticated enough to assess the strength of research findings without the convenience of applying a common
"community standard" in NHST.
In the more theoretical fields, for example in psychology, the traditional thinking is that the author can "prove"
a theoretically motivated hypothesis or a conceptual construct if the effect of that construct in an experiment
is statistically significant - meaning better than chance due to sample size, or individual difference or any sort
of noise in measurements, based on a pre-set criterion (e.g. p < 0.05 in a repeated measure F test). The absence
of meeting such a criterion means either the construct/hypothesis was misconceived, or the experiment was not
well designed, therefore there would be nothing worth reporting (as a footnote, this is not necessarily true. A well
reasoned hypothesis that does not pan out empirically often is very informative. Furthermore discouraging "null
results" publication biases meta-studies later on the field).
The use of dichotomous inferences is even more problematic in HCI. In (many parts of) HCI, we are not often
testing a single or simple theoretical construct. Accurately (confidently) knowing how similar in usability of an
UI is to another can be just as valuable than rejecting the Null Hypothesis that NHST is designed to do (another
footnote: it is very jarring to see so many HCI papers listing their good research questions as hypotheses, often
multiple incoherent hypotheses in one study altogether without a priori reasoning).
As a very first step, reporting exact p values and removing languages such as "statistically significant" seemed
very practical to me. Before computer programming and software became widely available, researchers had to look
up p values in statistical tables which had to be segmented in the value range. With software, the p values can be
as exact as needed. But stop at thousandths decimal place (e.g. p = 0.002) in reporting would appear more modest
in implying the precision of the measurement.
Definitely remove statements such as p < 0.05 or "statistically significant". Let’s do that! Let’s push back on those
naive reviewers who demand < signs and significance languages they learned in textbooks (or worse yet, only saw
and heard of them but never really seriously understood or reasoned along with textbooks).
PS. Don’t know what presentation format is most effective, perhaps inviting a commentator / discussant?
Relationship to Authors: nothing more than knowing one of the two authors for a long time.
Authors’ response
We are very grateful to our reviewers for their time and their excellent feedback. Many reviewers (including anony-
mous reviewers not quoted above) ask for concrete examples and guidance on how to interpret results without
using dichotomous significance language. In this new revision we provide pointers in the last paragraph of our
conclusion, both for interpreting p-values and confidence intervals.
Many of our reviewers agree that dichotomous inferences are a problem, but there is also some skepticism.Géry
Casiez remains unconvinced that exact p-values should be reported, and argues that “the direct consequence [of
doing so] is that p-values indicate the magnitude of an effect.” By effect magnitude most people mean the point
estimate of the population effect size, which often corresponds to the sample effect size (e.g., a difference in sample
means, or the sample Cohen’s d). This point estimate is a “best bet” of the population effect size. Although we fully
agree that p-values say nothing about the most likely population effect size, we disagree that reporting exact p-
values implies endorsing this misconception. p-values simply capture something different, most often the strength
of evidence against the hypothesis that the population effect size is exactly zero – which does say something about
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effect magnitude, although many would admit it is rarely what we want to know. Regardless, this strength of
evidence is on a continuous scale and this is what justifies the reporting of exact p-values.
We would like to clarify that by “exact p-value” we follow common terminology, which does not imply that p
should be reported with arbitrarily high precision (see also comments from Theophanis Tsandilas and Shumin
Zhai). Different sources recommend different levels of precision, and although we think that p-values are so noisy
that a single significant digit should suffice, how exactly p-values should be reported is a topic beyond the scope of
our paper. Only relevant to our paper is that many recommend reporting very small p-values as inequalities, which
introduces ambiguities in our analysis. This is because we do not know whether a statement such as p<.001 stems
from an “exact p” reporting practice, or indicates dichotomous inference with α=.001, or alternatively (and perhaps
more plausibly) categorical inference (e.g., reporting p<.001 as *** or very highly significant, p<.01 as ** or highly
significant, p<.05 as * or significant, and p>.05 as non-significant). To us, this type of categorical inference barely
differs from dichotomous inference, but we should have perhaps covered it more explicitly.
Some of our reviewers agree that dichotomous inferences are misguided but are uncertain to what extent they
really pose a problem. According to Theophanis Tsandilas, it remains to be seen if dichotomous inferences are
really harmful in practice, since CHI authors may use significance language to please reviewers while remaining
aware that they are an oversimplification. Presumably, such authors would still strive to convey the full complexity
of their results, and would end up drawing nuanced conclusions. We remain unconvinced that this represents a
common case. Our experience with CHI papers is that many authors completely fall into dichotomous thinking,
and among authors who do not, many present their findings in a way that can easily lead their readers to do so.
Similarly, Chat Wacharamanotham points out that dichotomous inferences may not be so problematic if most
CHI papers report very smallp-values and large effect sizes. This is an excellent point but again, from our experience,
this is very far from representing the majority of CHI papers, where many reported p-values are in the same order
of magnitude as (and often close to) .05. We do agree that it would be very informative to look more systematically
at the distribution of p-values and effect sizes in the CHI literature.
Theophanis Tsandilas asks the important and difficult question of why is there still an ongoing debate about di-
chotomous inference. We think status quo bias and motivated reasoning are one reason, and these tend to produce
weak arguments in defense of dichotomous inference. But we think there may also exist sophisticated arguments
in favor of dichotomous inference. In all honestly, we are currently unable to cite a paper that offers such argu-
ments, but we have not gone through all of the literature. There definitely are excellent researchers who endorse
dichotomous testing. We already mentioned the proposal to redefine statistical significance by changing the α
threshold to .005, a paper with many authors. A response to this paper, also written by excellent methodologists,
suggests to use custom α thresholds defined and justified ahead of time. Any use of α implies an endorsement of
dichotomous inference, but the authors do not explicitly engage with arguments against dichotomization of evi-
dence. Some prominent Bayesian statisticians andmethodologists are comfortable with dichotomous testing, while
others prefer to stay away from it. We are fairly certain, however, that no serious statistician or methodologist de-
fends NHST, i.e., the most prevalent way of doing dichotomous inference that involves an incoherent mixture of
Fisher and Neyman-Pearson methods. We do not think there is any serious debate about NHST-based dichotomous
inferences specifically. If there is any dichotomous inference method that makes sense, it is not NHST.
We did not discuss possible causes and solutions to the continued prevalence of dichotomous inferences at
CHI, but we enjoyed reading the reflexions offered by our reviewers. Concerning possible causes, we fully agree
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with Andy Cockburn, Theophanis Tsandilas and ChatWacharamanotham that the incentive structure in the
current publication system encourages dichotomous inferences, since many reviewers demand them and it is much
safer to comply. Our reviewers also point out that dichotomous inferences are popular because they are easy. They
are simple and objective decision making rules, even though as Andrew Gelman eloquently puts it, they are nothing
more than an “uncertainty laundering” machine meant to “create a sense of certainty where none should exist”. Not
relying on mechanical decision rules and using our judgment is naturally harder. Jessica Hullman, Theophanis
Tsandilas and Chat Wacharamanotham correctly point out at there is currently not much guidance for doing
so: there is a lack of educational resources, and there is no simple recipe to follow. We however think that writing
nuanced and non-dichotomous interpretations is not as difficult as many of our reviewers imply. Perhaps it is
intimidating and unfamiliar only because researchers got addicted to the false certainty provided by NHST. Many
papers have been already published that interpret results without resorting to significance language, for example
using a so-called “NeoFisherian” interpretation of p-values, or using a “new statistics” interpretation of interval
estimates (see the last paragraph of our paper). Actually, we think that any subjective interpretation of statistical
results is fine as long as results are reported clearly and readers can judge the evidence by themselves. When this
is the case, we do not think subjective language can abuse readers as Theophanis Tsandilas seems to fear. False
objectivity is much more likely to do so.
Our reviewers offer excellent suggestions for possible next steps.We are very sympathetic to Shumin Zhai’s sen-
timent that we should be bold, ban the use of statistical significance language in our papers, and push back against
reviewers. Meanwhile, we also agree with Andy Cockburn and Theophanis Tsandilas that a step change needs
to happen before authors can safely do away with statistical significance, and that such a transition will not be
easy. Chat Wacharamanotham has good ideas on how to accelerate the transition by better educating authors
and reviewers, and by improving the ways statistics are reviewed. We also like Geoff Cumming’s call for more
methodological discussions within the community and Xiaojun Bi’s suggestion to organize a panel at CHI (so far
only workshops and SIG meetings have been organized, see transparentstatistics.org). At the same time, we also
agree with Theophanis Tsandilas that we should not expect rapid changes, since such methodological discus-
sions are relatively recent at CHI and they have been involving a relatively small circle of people. Both Arnaud
Prouzaud and Chat Wacharamanotham suggest that our community could learn from the discipline of psy-
chology, althoughMatthew Kay warns us that dichotomous thinking is still prevalent in psychology, even among
methodological reformists.
What should replace dichotomous inference? BothAndyCockburn andTheophanis Tsandilaswonderwhether
a normative terminology with graded degrees of evidence (presumably used to interpret p-values) could replace the
normative terminology of statistical significance. Such a terminology would be fascinating to consider but as Theo-
phanis Tsandilas points out, canned interpretations like the ones suggested by Cohen for his d metric tend to be
abused once widely adopted. How strong or weak evidence is often depends on the context, and a badly calibrated
or overly strict normative terminology can do more harm than good. As Geoff Cumming suggests, moving away
from p-values (e.g., using frequentist or Bayesian estimation) could make it easier to avoid dichotomous inferences,
and can cure us from our obsession of disproving the null (see Shumin Zhai’s comment on why this should not be
HCI’s sole focus). But as Jessica Hullman recalls and as we have stressed in our introduction, dichotomization of
evidence can easily occur without p-values. We did observe that CHI papers that report confidence intervals with-
out p-values tend to rely less on dichotomous inferences. Theophanis Tsandilas has an interesting explanation
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of why this may be the case. We however think that the main reason is the recent popularity of the “new sta-
tistics” or “estimation statistics” philosophy, which simultaneously encourages the reporting of interval estimates
and discourages dichotomous interpretations. It is definitely possible to derive non-dichotomous conclusions from
p-values (see the last paragraph of our paper), but it just happens that papers promoting this approach have not
reached the popularity of papers about estimation statistics.
Ultimately, we wholeheartedly agree with Theophanis Tsandilas’s recommendation to focus on reporting re-
sults clearly and faithfully, perhaps with a particular emphasis on detailed descriptive statistics as suggested by
Shumin Zhai. This is in agreement with suggestions from several methodologists to give the reader the freedom to
reach their own conclusions. We also fully agree withGeoff Cumming that full transparency can only be achieved
if open science practices are adopted.
We thank our reviewers for their excellent suggestions for follow-up work. In particular Theophanis Tsandilas
for suggesting to explore our community’s attitudes in more depth, and ChatWacharamanotham for suggesting
to compare CHI with other fields. This paper is only a first step. It does not go deep into details but as Arnaud
Prouzeau points out, it provides an initial overview of the problem for a CHI audience and offers useful pointers for
people who want to learn more. We also agree with Jouni Helske, Jessica Hullman, and Theophanis Tsandilas
that the errors in our automated analysis are not trivial, and a follow-up study with more reliable classification or
coding methods would be an excellent goal to pursue.
Finally, we thank our reviewers for pointing out minor issues.We corrected the typomentioned by Jouni Helske.
Concerning ambiguous p-value formats, p<.001 and p <.0001 were only examples of occurrences: a p<X inequality
was considered ambiguous iif X<0.01. Concerning likelihood inference (“likelihoodist” is more correct), Chapter
1 of Sober’s book “Evidence and Evolution” has an excellent introduction. We however removed our mention of
likelihoodist inference, because it is likely very uncommon at CHI. We agree with Géry Casiez and Theophanis
Tsandilas that many papers report statistics only in figures, so we reworded our sentence.
